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Replies to Michela Bella, William
Curtis, and Emil Višňovský
Rosa M. Calcaterra
1 I  am  very  grateful  to  Michela  Bella,  William  Curtis,  and  Emil  Višňovský  for  their
thorough and generous interventions on my latest work. I  would also like to thank
EJPAP’s executive editors, Roberta Dreon and Sarin Marchetti, for hosting a symposium
on this book and Michela Bella for her editorial work. Each of the three contributions to
the symposium grasps some key features of my work, indeed the spirit that animated it,
even  if,  at  times,  my  statements  are  not  entirely  explicit.  Since  the  criticisms  are
especially  generous  towards  my  theoretical  commitment,  I  consider  the  three
contributions  as  an  exemplary  testimony  to  the  dialogical  form of  philosophical
discussions, so recommended by Rorty. 
2 Michela  Bella’s  intervention  reconstructs  the  chapters  of  my  book  in  detail,  and  I
appreciate  her  ability  to  explain  my  intentions  and  theoretical  choices.  Bella
immediately grasps the work’s overall focus, which is the interest in “the practical and
ethical aspects of Rorty’s contingency,” which runs parallel to my invitation to build “a
new  pragmatist  anthropology  that  goes  beyond  Rorty.”  I  have  always  cultivated  a
specific interest in philosophical elaborations’ practical and ethical implications, even
the  more  abstract  ones.  In  my  work,  I  address  such  issues  as  realism,
representationalism,  and  foundationalism;  the  development  of  the  criterion  of
justification in scientific research practices; the relationship between mind and body;
and  between  normative  and  descriptive.  Working  within  the  specific  field  of
epistemology, I have tried to show how all this always involves some stance on humans’
image, their potential, their limits, and, consequently, on the tools and projects that
may  appear  more  appropriate  to  their  existence.  All  these  issues  find  in  Rorty’s
contingentism, the theoretical background of an ethic of philosophy. This ethic tries to
remind  the  philosopher  of  his  responsibility  as  a  social  actor,  rather  than  as  an
aristocratic spectator of essences of truth, right, and beauty – to paraphrase James, one
of Rorty’s most beloved authors. Such a vision has circumscribed a series of “ethically
qualifying concepts,” such as dialogue, the conversation of humanity, and solidarity –
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as Bella notes. I believe that the epistemological choices to move from the foundation
to  the  justification  of  philosophical  or  scientific  assertions,  from  the  epistemic
centrality of the knowing subject to the construction of an informed consensus among
the subjects  who practice the search for  knowledge,  belong to the range of  ethical
criteria. To sum up, there is an epistemological choice that aims to replace the search
of certainty – stigmatized by Dewey and Wittgenstein – with the exercise of Socratic
irony. Indeed, Rorty’s ironic attitude closely resembles the Socratic irony that imposes
itself  at  the  origins  of  philosophy  and  authenticates  its  radically  human  meaning,
leaving the possession of absolute and immovable truths to the Gods or other extra-
human authorities stigmatized by Rorty.
3 Bella  skillfully  dwells  on  the  difference  between  “progress”  and  “change”  in
philosophy, which I pointed out as an essential aspect to clarify the socially active and
deeply  ethical  role  that  Rorty  attributes  to  philosophical  discourse.  Talking  about
changes rather than philosophical progress means setting aside the criterion implicit in
the latter concept – i.e., the idea that there is a fixed final goal of philosophical work.
The aim is to emphasize instead the philosopher’s responsibility of “uncovering the
tacit presuppositions” underlying our vocabularies and assertions, including the more
formal or specialized ones. At the same time, this means gathering Dewey’s lesson that
philosophical  reflection  “contributes  to  understanding  the  emergence  of  new
problems” or to reconstructing the “problematic situations” that set the humans’ paths
through new vocabularies.  Indeed,  for  Rorty,  recovering the ancient  ethical  task of
philosophy means enhancing its potential as a human tool for human life. It is up to us
to know how to  build  and use it  in  ways that  seem more appropriate  to  what  the
uncertainty of events requires.  Thus,  Dewey’s call  to revitalize philosophy’s ethical-
political function developed into Rorty’s invitation to use philosophy as a “critique of
culture,”  and  I  believe  his  critique  of  traditional  realist  and  foundationalist
epistemologies finds its proper place in such an invitation.
4 Concerning  Rorty’s  relationship  with  Dewey  and  James,  Bella  poses  two  critical
questions to which I can only partially answer. The first question concerns the theme of
anti-realism, the other concerns the evaluation of emotions. On the first point, I would
answer that there are differences, but perhaps they are not irreconcilable. Even Dewey
and James, no less than Rorty, support a distance from metaphysical realism, instead
promoting what can be defined as “pragmatic realism,” that is, a realism entrusted to
the functioning of our assertions on reality in terms of “regional” responses to the
problems that arise. I use the term “regional” to say that this perspective sets aside the
idea of a real universe that encompasses particular realities, according to systematic
relationships in terms of space and time, and for which we should prepare perspicuous
“representations” capable  of  reflecting the constitutive and eternal  features  of  this
universe. The idea of “pluriverse” adopted by James and Dewey’s instrumentalism goes
in this direction. Both these perspectives privilege the role of the specific problematic
situations we confront in the concreteness of scientific and philosophical investigation,
instead of searching for metaphysical constructions that give us the “essential,” eternal
and predetermined components of the real universe. The construction of “essentialist”
metaphysics  is,  in  fact,  unsustainable  in  a  post-Darwinian  climate  in  which  it  is
impossible to avoid embracing contingency – which here means anti-determinism, the
dynamism of  reality  and human transactions  with  it.  Additionally,  both  James  and
Dewey emphasize the importance of these transactions as moments of inception and, at
the  same  time,  verification  of  our  assertions  about  reality.  I  am  referring  to  the
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virtuous circle that both authors establish between the knowing subject and the real
world through their renewed concept of experience. They synthesize in the notion of
“experience” empirical and conceptual factors according to a relationship of mutual
functionality. My conviction is that in substance, Rorty shares the pragmatic realism of
James and Dewey. He refuses, however, to deepen the interference between empirical
and conceptual planes,  both because he rejects the very concept of experience as a
philosophical  instrument  and  because  he  is  all  too  concerned  with  maintaining  a
precise  distance  between  the  physical-natural  and  the  mental  plane.  For  he  is
convinced  that  their  combination  leads  to  the  “bad”  metaphysics  of  reductionist
naturalism.
5 On the other hand, like Peirce, Dewey and James renounce neither the idea of reality as
an epistemological presupposition nor as a regulatory idea of our cognitive practices à
la Kant. It is on this latter aspect that the distance from Rorty is most marked. Rorty
openly rejects both these versions of the concept of reality,  believing them to be a
legacy of foundational epistemology, in any case, superfluous compared to cognitive
practices.  In  this  regard,  I  cannot  entirely  agree with Rorty,  and I  believe  that  his
concern to zero out realist vocabulary often has the upper hand. This concern prevents
him both from embracing in his “linguistic pragmatism” the novelties that James and
Dewey had brought to this same vocabulary and from grasping an important meaning
of the concept of a “regulatory idea.” Starting from Kant, the latter means a criterion of
aggregation of  our cognitive and valuing practices.  It  would have been essential  to
consider James’ revalidation of the conceptions of knowledge as correspondence. In
this context, James states that we must not abandon the reference to the “facts” of
reality. Instead, we should stop considering the two poles of the cognitive relationship
– the subject and the reality – as static and ontologically opposed entities, to treat them
instead as the components of a process whose results must be commensurate with their
ability to contribute to the success of our actions. 
6 Bella asks if Rorty would have accepted James’ response to the “misunderstanding” for
which he was attributed an anti-realist position. I think he could have subscribed to it
as far as it would be contradictory to speak of pragmatism (no matter how “neo” he
wants  it  to  be)  excluding  pragmata –  i.e.,  excluding  inter-subjectively  recognizable
“facts”  and  “actions.”  However,  to  Rorty,  given  his  insistent  battle  against  realist
epistemologies, it would perhaps have seemed compromising to declare his approval of
James’ realism. Instead, I believe that a “pragmatic realism” enriched by the Rortyan
emphasis on linguistic practices would have benefited not only from a deepening of
Dewey and James’ particular realist vein but also from what I have elsewhere called
Mead’s “social realism” (cf. Calcaterra 2003). I have tried to show that, despite Rorty’s
much-acclaimed anti-realism, his position includes a tacit assent to the idea that our
assertions must  have some connection to what  we ordinarily  attribute to  the “real
facts.” Nevertheless,  it  is true that he merely takes this link for granted, just as he
prefers to “practice,” without adequately arguing, the functional relationship between
the descriptive and normative planes, both in epistemology and ethics.
7 I focused on the answer to Bella’s first question because I reserve the right to return to
the second – the theme of emotions – in answering to Višňovský’s intervention. I will
limit myself to saying that Rorty did not give enough space to emotions because he
considered  them  a  theme  philosophically  compromised  by  traditional  intuitionism,
which regards them as an absolutely private field and accessible only by immediate and
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strictly subjective means. This view contrasts with the intention of Rorty’s pragmatism,
which instead focuses on the public nature of linguistic practices. Emotions probably
appeared to Rorty too interwoven with psychologism, which, in his view, implied the
encroachment  of  psychology  into  philosophy,  thus  entailing  the  risk  of  naturalist
foundationalism.
8 In the introduction to his comments, Emil Višňovský writes that “Rorty’s philosophy
still  needs explications” and then points out my “attempts at  blending pragmatism
with  analytic  philosophy”  as  one  of  the  ways  in  which  I  try  to  benefit  from  the
challenges that the New York philosopher has brought to our attention. I would like to
point out that the term “challenges,” appearing in my work’s subtitle, means that the
vis polemica so characteristic of Rorty’s writings, sometimes deliberately exasperated,
should be taken seriously and not as a mere provocation by a “bad boy” of philosophy.
From  this  point  of  view,  I  found  it  inevitable  to  highlight  the  continuity  between
pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy  in  the  construction  of  Rorty’s  thought,  as
Višňovský  points  out,  starting  from  observing  the  cultural  role  he  assigns  to
philosophy.  The  idea  that  philosophy  is  a  factor  of  cultural-historical  processes  is
clearly expressed in the battle carried out by classic authors of pragmatism against
abstractionism and intellectualism of various kinds, primarily those found throughout
much of traditional philosophy. Alternatively, these authors made a strong appeal to
turn attention to the importance of the interplay between human ideas and practices,
between philosophy and concrete ethical orientations – social and individual. On the
other  hand,  analytic  philosophy  was  also  born  to  counteract  the  verbalisms and
conceptual  ambiguities  of  metaphysics  and as  a  tool  for  science  and philosophy to
interact on the field of analysis of language and its meanings. 
9 A glimpse at Rorty’s biography reveals the influence of the pragmatist mentality in the
early years of his education, both in the family and at university.  Nevertheless,  his
university studies focused on analytic philosophy, which Rudolf Carnap introduced him
to. Despite the common opinion on Rorty as an analytic philosopher who “converts”
himself to pragmatism, I believe that we should instead talk about a path that goes
from pragmatism to  analytic  philosophy and returns  to  pragmatism.  It  is  a  return
innervated by the criticism of the neopositivist strands of this movement of thought
and  the  so-called  “post-neopositivist”  turning  point  that characterized  analytic
philosophy  since  the  Sixties.  It  is  not  by  chance  that  post-neopositivism  gave
prominence to the link between language and praxis,  the criteria of sociality/inter-
subjectivity,  action and dynamism of thought and language. That is,  to criteria also
shared by pragmatist philosophies, both on the epistemological and ethical levels. The
interests  and  philosophical  themes  shared  by  pragmatism  and  analytic  philosophy
indeed entailed different directives but remain susceptible to integration.
10 Many  years  before  I  started  researching  Rorty’s  challenges  to  our  philosophical
climate, I organized a volume of essays on the relationship between pragmatism and
analytic philosophy, which aimed to deepen the thematic similarities between these
two strands of  thought without  failing to  point  out  methodological  and theoretical
differences  (Calcaterra  2011).  The  overall  result  of  this  volume,  which  was
unprecedented in Italy and perhaps also in Europe, was very positive, thanks to the
valuable  quality  of  the  essays  that  comprise  it.  This  outcome  encouraged  me  to
continue comparing the works of some representative authors from both theoretical
sides.  My  main  interest  was  to  clarify  or  make  explicit  the  objectives  and  socio-
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anthropological  effects  of  some  eminent  expressions  of  these  two  ways  of  doing
philosophy. In both traditions, I could find fruitful elements to increase awareness of
philosophy’s value as an activity supporting the individual and social-human path.
11 As already said, I have always been convinced that every philosophy or epistemological
theory implies some philosophical anthropology or some image of the human being.
This  image  is  interesting  or  even  necessary  to  make  explicit,  especially  where  the
reference to the human subject’s constitution seems non-existent. In comparison with
pragmatism,  many  technicalities  of  analytic  philosophy  seem  to  set  aside  the
anthropological theme altogether. Nevertheless, this philosophical orientation has the
indisputable merit of bringing verbal and symbolic language to the forefront. Language
can be considered the only and true species-specific characteristic of humans. The last
chapter of my book is precisely an attempt to trace on this basis the lines of a “new
pragmatic  anthropology,”  distilling  the  elements  of  Rorty’s  work  that  seem  to  be
engaging in this regard and that I have tried to develop also beyond Rorty.
12 Getting back to the “continuity” between pragmatism and analytic philosophy in Rorty,
I  am  interested  in  underlining  that,  as  Peirce  and  Dewey  taught,  talking  about
continuity  does  not  mean  talking  about  linear  repetition  or  the  possible  mutual
reduction  of  one  thing  to  another,  nor  the  absence  of  differences.  In  the  case  of
philosophical  reflection,  it  is  rather  a  matter  of  looking  beyond  the  philological
acrimony to  enucleate  common interests  without  disregarding  different  theoretical
and methodological tones.
13 My  intense  collaboration  with  Rosaria  Egidi  favored  my  research  in  Wittgenstein’s
work.  This author was pivotal  for my reflection on some possible connections with
pragmatic arguments and then formed the background to my effort to read Rorty’s
relationship  with  analytic  philosophy  in  a  less  oppositional  light  than  usual.  My
proposal to make Rudolf Carnap’s influence on the neo-pragmatist philosopher explicit
also  benefits  from  Wittgenstein’s  importance  in my  theoretical  research.  Emil
Višňovský points out my considerations on the similarities between Rorty and Carnap.
In these considerations, I tried to highlight the affinity of the “descriptive semantic”
and the theory of “linguistic frameworks,” elaborated by Carnap, with Rorty’s critique
of empirical foundationalism and with his deflationist approach to the concept of truth.
It  is  no  coincidence  that  these  aspects  of  Carnap’s  view  were  influenced  by
Wittgenstein, one of Rorty’s principal reference authors in constructing his linguistic
pragmatism. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty criticizes Carnap for reiterating
the  metaphysical  distinction  between  propositional  knowledge  and  knowledge  by
acquaintance. However, I believe that this criticism should be ascribed to the sort of
anti-foundationalist  obsession  that  has  unfortunately  undermined  several  Rortyan
philosophical assessments. Despite Rorty’s reading, I believe that Carnap’s distinction
should be incorporated into his theory of “linguistic frameworks” aiming to replace
foundationalist  representationalism  with  the  semantic  analysis  of  notions  such  as
“truth,”  “reality,”  and  “reference.”  This  comparison  would  deserve  further
investigation and could contribute to better understanding the positive evaluation that
Rorty reserves to the post-neopositivist strand of analytic philosophy, or what he calls
“epistemological behaviorism.” It is interesting to remember that, many years after the
publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty confessed that he would have
liked to rewrite most of this book, except the section dedicated to “epistemological
behaviorism,” which he continued to appreciate. 
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14 Višňovský judges my observations on Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as an interpretation that
favors his lively dialogue with Donald Davidson rather than Dewey’s influence. I agree
with this  reading and would just  like  to  add a  few clarifications.  I  am particularly
interested in remembering that Rorty’s criticism of the Deweyan concept of experience
aimed at eliminating the metaphysical residues he attributed to the Dewey of Experience
and Nature and thus avoiding the so-called “metaphysics of the subject” of Cartesian
heritage. According to Rorty, the latter survived in Dewey’s reference to the “private”
and immediate (or non-linguistic) aspect of human reality. From this point of view,
Rorty  would  be  right  to  say  that  the  concept  of  experience  is  all  too  ambiguous
precisely because it cannot tell us much of anything useful or shareable in terms of
shared linguistic  practices.  In the book,  I  defend a non-metaphysical  notion of  this
concept  that,  in  my  opinion,  constitutes  one  of  the  most  interesting  novelties  of
Deweyan thought for at least two reasons.  First,  it  is  deeply reshaped in the trans-
actional  sense;  second, because this  notion falls  within a “cultural  naturalism” that
tends  to  circumscribe  the  private-immediately-ineffable  element  involved  in  the
metaphysical concept of experience. In this sense, Dewey’s analysis of the aesthetic-
emotional  sphere  is  decisive  because  he  attempts  to  eliminate  the  metaphysical
presupposition  of  emotions’  ineffability,  linking  them  instead  to  the  interactive
relationship between the human subject and the physical-natural sphere. I agree with
Višňovský  when  he  argues  that  it  is  necessary  to  deepen  “the  relations  between
linguistic practices and non-linguistic elements of reality,” as he himself did in many
important philosophical papers. However, it is not yet clear to me to what extent it is
possible to speak of “experience” without resorting to the linguistic-conceptual tools at
our disposal. Perhaps also on this point, as Rorty would say, we need new vocabularies.
In  those  currently  in  use,  I  can  mainly  find  a  generic  reference  of  the  concept  of
experience either to the sensory apparatus or to the phenomenological “experience.”
However,  phenomenologists  cannot  proceed  without  a  linguistic  decoding  of
experience. In any case, I am convinced that it would be unfair to attribute to Rorty an
underestimation  of  the  physical-natural factors  of  human  life.  Although  he  never
considered  naturalism  as  a  sort  of  “philosophìa  prima” to  reduce  the  whole  human
reality, he never hesitated to join the ranks of naturalists.
15 William Curtis  focuses  his  stimulating  intervention  on  the  questions  that  my book
indirectly raises about the possible interpretations of Rorty’s political thinking, which
has provoked a rather lively debate. Therefore, Curtis urges me to take a position in
this  debate  and  evaluate  the  interpretations  of  Robert  Brandom  and  Richard
Shusterman. My preliminary statement that I want to leave this aspect of Rorty’s work
aside seems to Curtis a legitimate choice but not fully realized. I have devoted a few
pages to Rorty’s intervention on feminism, where I touched on Nancy Fraser’s criticism
of the form of liberalism he proposes; moreover, I have touched on the theme of liberal
democracy in several chapters. In honesty, there were three reasons for not addressing
Rorty’s  political  thinking to  a  sufficiently  large  extent.  The first,  and fundamental,
consists in the fact that I am not a philosopher of politics in the strict sense of the
word;  that is  to say,  I  do not think I  have the necessary technical  skills  to make a
discourse appropriate to the epochal urgency of a debate on liberalism. In short,  it
seemed more appropriate to focus on the theoretical aspects, which I believe have a
practical and ethical scope, and therefore a necessarily political fallout in the broad
sense. The second reason is closely related to the first and concerns my belief in the
political value of reflection and philosophical discourse as such. I want to add that one
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does politics when practicing reflection and philosophical discourse, simply because
every reflection and discourse tends to be public, directed to people who, willingly or
not, live a polis, no more or less than those who make philosophy. I would say with
Peirce – who is often hastily judged as the least “political” character of pragmatism –
that even when we talk to ourselves, we implicitly address someone else. In short, even
the so-called inner monologue is a dialogue – the so-called Peirce’s “Tuism.” The third
and final reason for my choice not to deal expressly with Rorty’s political thinking is
that his pronouncements on this level do not adequately reflect the ethical quality of
his philosophical discourse.
16 However, I try to answer Curtis’s crucial question: “Can Rorty be labeled as a ‘pragmatic
classical liberal’”? My idea is that this label can be legitimate if used in the sense that
Richard Posner adopts it, i.e., as the title of a liberal position closer to John Stuart Mill
than to  Hayek and that,  in  any case,  embraces  relativism and skepticism.  In  other
words, I consider this label acceptable as long as one takes seriously into account the
emphasis of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism on the ironic attitude to which he associates his
political vision: an attitude that, roughly speaking, corresponds to his contingent anti-
foundationalism.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  classical  forms  of  liberalism  could
accommodate irony in Rorty’s established sense. At the same time, I doubt that Rorty’s
irony and anti-foundationalism can be considered skeptical expressions excluding once
and for all the notion of foundation. There is a conceptual difference, and therefore
also  a  practical  one,  in  considering  “foundation”  in  aprioristic  and static  terms  or
considering  it  instead  as  a  logical  and  practical  supporting  ground  historically
developed,  and  which  operates concretely  in  our  cognitive  and  ethical-political
practices. In this second meaning, which I would call “contingentist” for brevity’s sake,
there is no presumption that there is a reality behind such practices and their intrinsic
linguisticity.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  our  practices  are  evanescent  or
entrusted  to  mere  chance.  Instead,  the  contingentist  meaning  of  the  notion  of
“foundation” recalls the centrality of the pragmata in the construction of epistemic and
value criteria and, at the same time, underlines the fact that they – precisely because of
their contingency – are modifiable. We should understand the couple of irony and anti-
foundationalism presented in Rorty in this light. Therefore, it is correct to speak of his
contingentism as  the  opening  to  a  pragmatic  conception  of  the  term “foundation”
rather than simple zeroing. In other words, this means seeking the foundation on the
ground of the practice and justifications that accompany its formation, persistence, and
evolution.
17 Rorty would most likely say that this point of view inclines too much towards a sort of
metaphysics of praxis. Provided that the word “metaphysics” is a very slippery one, I
believe that the notion of “pragmatic foundation,” as I quickly outlined it, is necessary
to account for several qualifying aspects of Rorty’s “liberal utopia.” First, I do not see
how  else  one  could  read  its  ethnocentrism,  which  assigns  the  historical-cultural
context a  solidity that no petitio  principii can easily circumvent.  Moreover,  it  would
otherwise be difficult to understand all those “ethically-qualifying concepts” already
mentioned  –  conversation,  dialogue,  solidarity,  and  finally,  anti-authoritarianism  –
which Curtis rightly defines in his book Defending Rorty. Pragmatism and Liberal Virtue
(2015) as a “super virtue” that supports “the civil virtue of irony.” To say that anti-
authoritarianism is a virtue means to give value to a moral skill, but one that finds in
Rorty  historical-philosophical  justifications  and  that,  therefore,  can  “work”  as  a
supporting ground for a series of socio-political practices that safeguard the primary
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value of individual freedom. I am convinced that it would be unfair to associate this last
aspect of Rorty’s thought with the defense of an unbridled neo-liberalism, as various
interpreters  tend  to  do,  including  Fraser  (1997),  with  her  comments  on  Rorty’s
intervention  on  feminism.  Nevertheless,  I  confirm  my  preference  for  the  idea  of
“radical democracy” put forward by Dewey. The discriminating point lies in Dewey’s
explicit  reference to  social  justice,  which I  am not  willing to  bypass  (in  fact,  these
references by Dewey are limited to his production of the 1930s). 
18 In this regard, I agree with Shusterman on seeing in Dewey a tighter commitment to
the  articulation  of  the  individual-society  relationship  that,  unlike  for  Rorty,  is  not
likely to be unbalanced in favor of individuality. However, I would add that, although
many pages of Rorty imply the individualist risk, unlike Shusterman, I believe that he
also proposed some appreciable antidotes: first of all, the concept of solidarity, which is
one of the cornerstones of his thinking. I  tried to discuss this aspect,  arguing that,
especially in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, just starting from the narrative model of
personal  identity  that  he  proposes,  solidarity  is  configured  as  a  “destination”  of
individuality.  Narrating  one’s  personal  history  is  tantamount  to  seeking  the
recognition of others and, finally, trying to “accommodate” one’s own identity with
one’s  relationship  with  others.  In  short,  one  could  count  Rorty  among  the
representatives of the so-called “solidarity individualism” rather than label him as a
liberalist  perched  on  the  defense  of  individuality.  I  believe  that  Rorty’s  important
novelty concerning traditional foundationalism – liberal or not – lies in his insistence
that  ethical  and  political  projects  should  consider  the  relationship  between  the
aesthetic sphere and the social sphere. The emphasis on self-realization seems to me to
go in this direction, especially if we consider that this concept typically dates back to
Emerson,  whom  Rorty  does  not  hesitate  to  count  among  the  founding  fathers  of
pragmatism. As we know, Emerson’s individualism has an instrumental value compared
to his battle against authoritarianism, and yet it is expressed in a continuous dialectic
with the attention to the value of the community.
19 In  conclusion,  thanking  Curtis  for  having  paid  attention,  as  Bella  also  did,  to  my
discussion of Peirce’s Tychism, I tried to enhance a “new pragmatic anthropology” to
build on some of Rorty’s suggestions. I do not have much to add to Curtis’ comments on
this subject. I just want to confess that I did not dwell on Rorty’s hasty references to
Tychism  in  the  text  cited  by  Curtis,  The  Continuity  between  the  Enlightenment  and
‘Postmodernism,’  simply because I  chose to exercise the principle of charity but,  this
time, not in the sense of the Quine-Rorty line, but the exquisitely Christian sense... In a
few words, finding those references completely off-track, I  avoided raging on a few
lines, preferring instead to recall Peirce to suggest how the dialectic between chance
and law implied by his Tychism can contribute to confer to the notion of chance the
meaning of an indeterminate/ambiguity that opens the space of normativity. 
20 I  am  aware  that  I  have  responded  far  from  exhaustively  to  the critical  questions
addressed to me. I hope to reap the benefits in the near future, again thanking Bella,
Curtis, and Višňovský for their generosity. 
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